An unexpected connection on the professional network. A proposal of work from a headhunter, probably a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The chance to make perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China containing confidential or privileged insights. Payment in cryptocurrency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that an element about this method would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to try it – leading the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their operations online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief the agency's director said Chinese agents were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of ten thousand over the preceding two and a half years, attempting to obtain political, industrial, military and scientific classified information. But a new campaign targeting politicians and parliament has led the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage alert was distributed on Tuesday via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to contact MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Changes
In the typical manner of UK security services, there was no official release of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. Yet the agency was aware its advisory document would become public once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press helps the wider public more easily recognize communications with a fraudulent intent.
This warning has the impact of uncovering additional details from in and around parliament, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The service aims for public figures to recognize that simply because exchanges on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been responding to a particular event in the legislature, though the recent actions occur after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his associate another person on a legal detail in recent months.
Both individuals had been charged of spying for China – a charge they denied – but inability to successfully conclude a prosecution under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Legislation and China's Long-Term Goals
Legislation has since been updated, and the MI5 slide includes a reminder of its replacement: “Individuals involved in espionage activity face substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a crime if a person participates in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious inquiry, though, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet the Chinese government is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Variations and Persistent Digital Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Authoritarian governments like Beijing's utilize intelligence collection techniques and the scale of its spy network is enormous, employing three hundred thousand individuals. A former US official, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for which details is considered to be useful,” security minister Dan Jarvis informed MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in an individual rapidly peripheral turning significant.
Another way to consider the continuous activities at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the international competition between Beijing and the west at a threshold under the point of direct conflict. China has stepped up its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless internet devices.
Beijing is engaged in persistent attempts to find secret informants on British democracy online because it seeks to be provocative, to display power and because it can.
